tendency among scholars and the public alike to dismiss East German television as a pale version of the West and as a mere tool of state propaganda. 3 Such incidents are striking evidence that media history is another facet of the highly contested political and social history of post-war Germany. Indeed, the historiographical tendency to present the West German state as the naturally correct model for a post-war German state, while viewing the East German state as a 'failed experiment', has also informed historical interpretations of East German television. 4 This interpretation misunderstands the real significance of television. Television has never been a non-political medium, rather it has always functioned in the service of the social, political and economic system from which it has emerged. In capitalist societies such as the post-war Federal Republic, the relationship between television and state power has been difficult to identify; capitalist culture seems to have no real centre of power from which any one person or institution can direct media messages, though certain individuals and institutions have more power than others to shape both the medium and the message.
5 Moreover, scholars and lay people alike are convinced of the legitimacy of the market mechanism. In particular, the widespread belief that programme ratings are an unproblematic expression of audience desire erroneously situates power over programming within the viewing public, not within production or distribution of programmes. Audiences can only make choices based on the programming delivered to their television screens; most would rather watch something than nothing and often will choose the 'lesser of two evils.' 6 In communist societies such as the former GDR, on the other hand, the relationship between television and the government has been deceptively easy for historians to discern; the state seemed to control the medium simply by virtue of the hierarchical structure of state power. Yet television ultimately served the purposes of state ideology in both societies: capitalist modernization in the Federal Republic and state socialism in the Democratic Republic. The deeper question, which this chapter aims to answer, is not whether, or how, the SED warped television to accomplish its own goals, but rather the ways in which television as a new and powerful medium was able to visualize the social, political and economic ideology of the GDR and shape the world views of Germans living there; how did television mediate 'real and existing socialism' before the collapse of the GDR in 1989?
Over the course of the post-war period, GDR television's relationship to the state and its audience fundamentally changed. First, in examining the changing relationship between television and the ruling communist party I argue that, although the SED increasingly supervised television broadcasting, the DFF never functioned simply as a mouthpiece of the state. Instead it was an institution that mediated between the state and the East German audience, shaped by the agendas of a variety of groups from technicians, to artists to government officials and so on. This was especially true in the early years of television, when television workers retained relative freedom and the character of
